Abstract
Introduction
The organization of large sized events can be challenging depending on how you are positioned in your social network and how fast your message is spread. In modern times, with the advent of Internet Social Networks, the speed of message spreading was greatly increased, thus creating a new way of organizing events.
These events can be a Flashmob [1] , a large party or even political and cultural protests [2] . A measure of impact of such events can be of practical interest for planning security measures or political tactics.
But, in some occasions, the organizers try to inflate the impact of such events by employing bots. These bots are computer programs that automatically share the designated messages, on the social network desired by the user, improving the reachability of the message.
The employment of these bots may lead to incorrect conclusions about the statistical study of the event.
Two Social Networks often used for promotion of events are the Facebook [3] and the Twitter [4] . Recently, two protests have taken place in Brazil within a two-day period. The first one, in March 13, was organized by a group of people that approved the recently elected government, while in March 15, the protest was organized by the parties opposed to the government [5] . In both events, there were a massive use of those two social networks for calling the people to the streets and promoting the sentiment in favor or against the government.
A small fraction of the messages were massively shared by the social networks users and in a few of them it was detected an intense use of bots. In this paper, we will represent the message sharing dynamics as a graph of sharing relations between users and we will apply different well known metrics in order to verify the differences of the graphs induced by genuine message sharing with those induced by the use of bots.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first, in Section 2 we will give a brief explanation of the studied political scenario, then in Section 3 we will explain about the Twitter Network and how to represent the dynamics of message sharing through a graph. A literature review of this topic is given in Section 4. In Section 5, the complete methodology and analysis of eighteen different tweets are shown followed by some final remarks in Section 6.
Brazilian political protests
At the end of the Brazilian presidential elections runoff, after a polarized campaign between the two main candidates, the president Dilma Rousseff, from Workers' Party, was reelected as president of Brazil by a small margin of votes, 3,459,963 (roughly 3.28% of the electors). The presidential campaign of 2014 was marked by intense debates between the two favorite candidates since the first round, mobilizing an ample electoral debate. On the Internet Social Networks, supporters and militants had an intense battle in producing favorable information for their candidates as well as negative content about the opposing candidate.
Disagreeing with the loss of the candidate Aécio Neves (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), their supporters and groups opposed to the Workers' Party manifested their unhappiness on the Internet with declarations of hatred and prejudice against the voters of the Workers' Party, maintaining an intense on line political mobilization. As a result from this articulation, groups against the government organized through digital media (Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp) a protest that was known as Panelaço (pan beating) on March 8, 2015 . In this event, the protesters made a loud noise throughout the country, by beating pans, during the initial statement of the President Dilma Rousseff on national broadcast.
On March 15, 2015 took place at the streets the first and largest manifestation against Dilma Rousseff, in several different cities, asking for her impeachment. Millions of people went to the streets in order to protest against the inflation of prices and corruption reports. Curiously, this protest was preceded by a mobilization, two days before, by militants of the current government. Besides the occupation of the streets, the political debate on the Internet Social Networks was intensified during both events. As a result, the impact and overall sentiment of these two groups can be estimated by the messages posted and shared on line.
One way to measure the impact is through a study of the message sharing dynamics. This study tries to quantify the speed and coverage of the popular messages.
Twitter message diffusion model
Twitter is an Internet social network [6] with the objective of transmitting short messages to your contacts. Its original goal was to improve the speed of communication of an office environment, in which a given employee would write a short message reporting his current status. The idea got popular and nowadays this social network is used to share facts and moments from your daily life, opinions and promoting events. In this network, the set of nodes is represented by the users and the set of edges are directed links between two users, expressing a relationship of followerfollowing. The message written by a given user is displayed into the Twitter web site for every user who follows him.
After getting in touch with a message, the user can take some actions like reply to this message, retweet (share) this message and mark the message as a favorite. The action of retweeting a message will display the message to the followers of the user who retweeted it, thus spreading the message beyond the ego-network of the original user. This simple interaction is capable of quickly spreading a message to thousands of users, most of which unknown to the original user.
In this paper, we define the Retweet Diffusion Network (RDN) as a directed network modeled after the dynamics of the sharing mechanism of a single tweet message. In this network, the nodes represent users and the edges express the relationship of a user retweeting the message through another use. So, the first node of this network will be the user who originally created the message. The subsequent nodes will be inserted after a follower of one the users in the network retweets this message. Notice that the edge is created only between users who also share a followerfollowing relationship. As such, this network is capable of depicting the path that the message traveled through.
This network can be collected by using the Twitter public API (dev.twitter.com). In this interface, every tweet is associated with a given user. Whenever someone retweets a message, a new tweet data is created with the same content associated with the user who retweeted it. This new message will have a field indicating that this is a retweeted message (RT) and another field containing the user who originally tweeted such message.
As we can see, the API does not give the complete information since the message could have been retweeted indirectly from a follower of the original user. So, the generation of the RDN must be estimated through the relationships between the users who retweeted the original message.
In [7] this estimation was performed by following a simple rule: for a given user in the RDN, an edge will be created to the node representing someone he follows in the original Twitter network. If there is more than one possibility, the connection will be created by first filtering the users he follows that retweeted the message at most 15 minutes prior to his retweet action. The user with the most number of followers from this list will be chosen for the edge creation.
Also, [7] fitted a model for the RT rate E that predicts the percentage of the followers of a given user that will retweet its message. This model was reported to be accurate since the number of followers, the number of followings and the average RT rate of every studied user followed the same power law distribution. The fitted model was described by the following equation: (1) where Followers refers to the number of followers of the given user and Followings is the number of users this particular user follows.
Impact of bots in the model
The Twitter bots [8] , [9] , [10] are computer programs impersonating a real person in order to accomplish a designated task. Usually, this task is to promote a message from its owner to a larger audience. Some of those bots offer a paid service, allowing any user to promote his ideas.
This may be of interest for many companies or organizations in order to promote new products, spread news, increase advertising revenue, and so on. Additionally, many political parties make use of those bots to spread rumors about their adversaries [11] and promote accomplishments from their candidates [12] .
Regarding the paid services on Twitter, the user chooses one message to be shared by a bunch of bots and, after the payment, a very large team of bots retweet such messages, without the need of following the original user. Another type of paid bots on Twitter does not share any message of the paying user, but start following this user for a given period of time.
Obviously, the combination of those two bots disrupts the model given by Eq. 1 in two ways: i) the number of followers may be overestimated, ii) the predicted impact of a message will be much less than the one measured for this particular user. Not only this model, but many other studies may be affected by such practice like the study of trending topics [13] , [14] , sentiment analysis [15] , [16] , general statistics about an event, and studies of network science [17] of the network created by this event. So, it is important to verify such occurrences in order to separate them from the remaining data.
In [18] the authors proposed a model to classify the users of Twitter as humans, bots or cyborgs (bots with human interactions). They reported a high accuracy model with the drawback of requiring some features with a high acquisition cost. This model can be useful to create a black list of users flagged as bots. Differently from this model, we intend to suggest a methodology to detect RDNs with suspicions of being created with the use of bots, thus complementing their work.
Experiments
This section will briefly describe the methodology employed for this study and the data acquisition 
Methodology
In order to investigate the impact of the bots on the RDNs, we used a collection of tweets obtained during the period of 12th through 16th of March, 2015. These tweets were collected in real time using the Twitter Streaming API filtered by the hashtags from The number of retweets (RTs) per tweet follows a power law. This fact implicates that most tweets have just a small number of RTs, while fewer tweets received a significant amount of RTs. For the sake of brevity, we have selected the top 9 tweets with most RTs for each of the two days of manifestations (March 13th and 15th) from the collection.
The selected tweets are summarized in Table 2 for March 13 and in Table 3 for March 15. In these tables we report the user who originally tweeted, the summarized message translated into English, the number of retweets it received (RTs), and whether the message was pro-government (Pro), against it (Con), or neutral (i.e., reporting news). Additionally, those messages in which we found the presence of bots on the corresponding RDNs are marked as such.
Notice that, in order to ensure which RDNs made use of the bots, we have manually verified each one of them by searching for the occurrence of users with a behavior of retweeting unrelated messages in different languages. Also, the majority of such users do not have any connection (direct or indirect) with the user who originally tweeted the message. Some points should be clarified from these tables. First of all, the hashtag #GloboGolpista is related to the Globo TV Station that was being accused of manipulating the people against the government, the hashtags #Dia13DiaDeLuta, #VemPraRua, and #15deMarço were used as a cry to call out for the people for each protest. The hashtags #ForaDilma and #ForaLula was a cry against the elected president Dilma Rousseff and the former president Lula.
Regarding the users mentioned in Table 2 , sigaruiz, reginazukato, and RodP13, are political activists in favor of the current government, while coisasdogaspa is an activist against the government, HPozzuto is a politic affiliated with the PT party, Pragmatismo_ and TerraNoticiasBR are two news agencies, SOS_RIO is an account with the goal of retweeting news about corruption in Rio de Janeiro, RachelSherazade is a news anchor famous for having conservative beliefs, Yusnaby and DaniloGentili are comedians, LuanaPiovaniTV and CauaReymondBR are fake accounts from famous Brazilian actors. Lanataenel13 is an Argentinian journalist and dilmabr is a parody account of the current president of Brazil.
As we can see from Tables 2 and 3 , there was a majority of tweets against the government even during the protests in favor of the government. And from those in favor of the government, the top 3 made use of bots. The RDN for each message was created following the algorithm described in Sec. 3. From now on, each RDN will be named RDNn_d where n is the row number in Tables 2 and 3 , and d is the day of the protest (i.e., 13 or 15).
Results
In the following subsections we present the achieved results.
Goodness of fit.
As a first test, we have applied the model proposed in [19] for every RDN of this study. Our assumption here is that, if the bots inflates the expected impact of a tweet, the predictions of this model will render a greater error.
In order to verify this hypothesis, the goodness of fit (R 2 ), Mean Absolute Error (MAE), and Mean Squared Error (MSR) for the predictions of the RDNs impact were calculated.
These error measures quantify the difference between the predicted and the measured values, the MAE calculates the average of the absolute value of the errors for every prediction, the resulting value indicates how close, in general, the predictions were from the measured values. The MSR averages the squared errors values, this measure evidences the existence of larger errors. The goodness of fit describes how well the model fits to the measured values. In this paper we have used the chi-squared measure: where y and y' are the measured and predicted values, respectively, and V 2 is the variance of the observed values.
The results are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for March 13 and March 15, respectively.
As we can see from Table 4 , the error measures were larger for RDN1_13, one of the RDNs that made use of bots. The goodness of fit was smaller for the three RDNs created with bots, though just the first two were significantly smaller. Regarding Table 5 , the average error stayed below the 0.01 mark, and the goodness of fit was higher than 0.8 for every RDN. As such, the goodness of fit of this model applied to the RDNs seems to be a good indicative of the use of bots.
Basic statistics.
Next, we have calculated some basic statistics for the RDNs. We have measured the number of nodes, number of edges, the size of the giant component, depth of the retweet tree (as measured by the network diameter), and the average degree.
From Table 6 we can see the results obtained for the networks of March 13. As expected, the RDNs with bots have a very small average degree (close to zero) since most bots do not have any connection with any other user of the RDN and, as a consequence, they are mostly disconnected. This disconnection can be measured by the giant component. The only exception in this experiment is for the RDN1_13, which has an average degree slightly above 1 and is mostly connected. Regardless, the average degree is still small enough to contrast with the RDNs without bots. Now, in Table 7 , we can see that the smaller giant component was obtained by RDN4_15, but still much larger than those RDNs with bots from the previous table. The average degree of these RDNs ranged from as high as 23.32 to as low as 2.56, which would flag some of these RDNs as suspected of using bots.
Degree distribution.
In many real-world networks, the node degree distribution usually follows a power-law [20] :
It is particularly interesting that networks from the same nature will usually have a similar exponent (D). Our hypothesis is that the use of bots would drastically change such exponent. To explore this possibility we will plot the degree distribution of each RDN and estimate the value of D with the technique proposed in [20] , [21] , [22] . Since some of these RDNs have many nodes with a degree value of zero, we have added a value of 1e-6 to the degree values in order to correctly estimate the value of D.
In Fig. 1 we can see the power law distributions for each RDN along with their exponents (D, see Eq. 3). The higher this exponent, the faster the distribution tends to zero, and thus a greater number of users will have just a small number of RTs. Since the bots retweet messages from users that they do not follow, it is expected that the RDNs are disconnected and that most of the users, if not all of them, does not have any RT from theirs following list, increasing this exponent. From this figure 1, we can observe that the use of bots on the first three RDNs impacted on the exponent value when compared with the remaining RDNs. As we can see, the typical values for this set of RDNs is around 3 to 5, the use of bots increase the exponent to values above 10. Notice though that RDN8_13 has a slightly larger value of D.
The Fig. 2 depicts the power law for the RDNs of March 15. The exponent values for these RDNs remained around the 3 to 6, a slightly broader range than the previous set of figures.
Centrality of nodes.
Finally, in [19] it is also argued that the Eigenvector centrality of the egonetwork of the original user may positively influence the reachability of the tweet. As such, since the impact measured on an RDN with bots differs from the prediction model, the real influence of the user, as measured by the Eigenvector, must be smaller than what is expected.
So, for each RDN, the ego-network of every user was captured using the Twitter API and combined into a single network. With this network we can estimate the centrality measures of every user of interest for this research and the nodes distribution that characterizes the common pattern of the networks formed by the same model. The ego-network was created by first collecting the followers list of every user in the RDN using the Twitter API.
As we can see from Tables 8 and 9 , there is no clear correlation between the eigenvector centrality and the depth (reachability) of the RDN or even the number of retweets obtained (Tables 2 and 3 ). But, the Eigenvector Centrality of the original user of the three RDNs with bots had significantly smaller values when compared to the others RDNs.
In Fig. 3 we can see a regression plot of the relationship between the Eigenvector Centrality and the depth of the RDN. As we can see from this plot, there is no clear correlation between these two values.
Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the use of bots on Twitter during two Brazilian protests: one in favor and another against the government. More precisely, we have analyzed nine different messages shared on this network and the sharing dynamics of such messages by modeling them as a Retweet Diffusion Networks. Different metrics were applied into these RDNs in order to see whether those generated with the use of bots contrasted against those without bots.
The use of bots for automating the sharing procedure of a message may impact the statistical analysis of one event. When inspecting only the raw numbers of message sharing events, without considering the bots, may lead to a false impression of a high impact behavior of the population.
Of the applied metrics, every one of them had a significant numerical difference between the RDNs with and without bots. The Eigenvector Centrality measure (Tables 8 and 9 ) was the one with the most consistent difference regarding the RDNs with and without bots, though it requires an additional cost of building the ego-network.
The average degree (Tables 6 and 7 ) and the goodness of fit (Tables 4 and 5) were also good metrics regarding the differences and can be easily calculated with the collected data. Finally, though the exponent of the power law distribution (Figs. 1 and 2) were also different when comparing the different types of RDNs, the obtained values may vary when applied to networks of different natures or collections of tweets of different topics.
In close, the simple metric of average degree may be sufficient to raise suspicion of the use of bots on a sharing event. But as the bots service evolves, they may also be capable of offering a network of followers to the original user, raising the average degree to the expected values. It is still unclear, though, how this would affect the other metrics used on this study. As such, we plan to investigate this possibility as the next step of our research.
Notice also that the values obtained on this study was limited to a particular event regarding a single subject and constrained to a single country, as such these results cannot still be used as is for RDNs originating from different discussions. But, it is expected that the differences between RDNs with and without bots still exist, so at least one concrete example of an RDN with the use of bot and one example without bots of the studied event in order to create a baseline of comparison.
